This transcript has been auto generated
00;00;01;28 - 00;00;27;02
Jonathan Porter
Welcome to another episode of Husch Blackwell’s False Claims Act Insights podcast. I’m your host, Jonathan Porter. Today, we're going to talk about one of the biggest Supreme Court cases of the year. It’s not a false claim, that case. But this case is so big that it could have a major impact on FCA enforcement. The case is Loper Bright, which overturned decades of federal deference to government agencies, also known as Chevron deference.
00;00;27;18 - 00;00;50;29
Jonathan Porter
Chevron was a big deal to companies operating in regulated industries because it gave the regulators a tremendous amount of power. That power has been significantly scaled back now as the Supreme Court ended Chevron deference and a vehicle for ending, Chevron came in a tiny little package. Loper Bright a case about a rule the National Marine Fisheries Service implemented to study overfishing.
00;00;51;14 - 00;01;22;04
Jonathan Porter
That’s it. A huge legal concept overturned because of a rule about how the fisheries service can study overfishing. Now, at this point, you should be asking how a fisheries service rule could impact FCA enforcement. Well into a longer answer in a few minutes. But the short answer is that low for bright impacts, materiality, analysis. We talked about materiality analysis in a past episode in which Kip Randall explained that a garden variety regulatory shortcomings, those don’t equal FCA violations.
00;01;22;16 - 00;01;42;16
Jonathan Porter
The shortcoming has to be of the type that would have changed the agency’s mind. It had to have been material to their decision making. That's materiality. And today, we're going to explore why Loper Bright and the end of Chevron can have an impact on materiality. Joining us to put all of this together is my Husch Blackwell colleague, Tanner Cook.
00;01;43;04 - 00;02;02;13
Jonathan Porter
Tanner is based in St. Louis and valued member of our firm’s False Claims Act working group. It seems like every time I hear about a big win, our firm accomplishes for our clients. Tanner is part of the team that made that happen. Tanner’s really bright. He always seems to be one step ahead of everyone else on how cases impact our clients in less obvious ways.
00;02;02;14 - 00;02;17;19
Jonathan Porter
And so Tanner is the perfect guest to talk about the end of Chevron and that impact on False Claims ACT enforcement. So Tanner, thanks for coming on the podcast and telling our listeners about how low for Bright could impact materiality analysis in the False Claims Act.
00;02;18;07 - 00;02;20;10
Tanner Cook
Yeah. Thanks, Jonathan. Looking forward to the discussion.
00;02;20;21 - 00;02;46;15
Jonathan Porter
Thanks, Tanner. So Tanner, this is a false claims podcast, but before we talk about FCA, let’s make sure our listeners understand exactly what Chevron was and how it was overturned, because I think that that would be helpful. Background for understanding how Loper Bright could change FCA enforcement. So Chevron was seen as a as largely empowering the executive branch, letting federal agencies operate with tremendous judicial deference.
00;02;46;25 - 00;03;11;20
Jonathan Porter
Chevron said that courts should defer to federal agencies when Congress wasn’t clear in a statute. And from a practical perspective, I think it makes sense what agencies charged with running a program decide how to run the program. But for the last couple of decades, those in regulated industries begin to blame Chevron for mounting regulatory burdens. And so Chevron had a target on its back for a while, for years.
00;03;11;21 - 00;03;35;07
Jonathan Porter
And finally, this case load Bright comes along and accomplishes what many commentators have called for for a while, ending Chevron. But it took a special set of facts for that to happen. And as Chief Justice Roberts said at oral argument in lower bribed, the Supreme Court really hadn't relied on Chevron in deciding a case in quite a long time, seemingly because Chevron wasn't having the impact that some thought it did have.
00;03;35;21 - 00;03;51;22
Jonathan Porter
So let’s start by talking about the facts of this case. Loper Bright Because I happen to think that the facts give a great window into the types of cases where a local break could have a meaningful impact in the future. So, Tanner, if you could tell our listeners the story of Logan Bright.
00;03;52;08 - 00;04;07;28
Tanner Cook
Yeah, no, I think that's a great point. And it’s, you know, as you alluded to, it sort of sounds like a unique set of facts. But as we're going to learn, I think it actually has very broad implications. So at a general level, this was a case involving a rule, as you noted, by the National Marine Fisheries Service.
00;04;08;05 - 00;04;33;26
Tanner Cook
And the rule in particular, required fishing companies to essentially pay the costs for federal monitors that were assigned to their boats to sort of police overfishing. And the company that was challenging the rule felt that the rule was in conflict with or wasn't allowed by the statute. In the statute was the Magnuson Stevens Act, the MSSA. And that was really the thrust of it.
00;04;33;27 - 00;04;57;14
Tanner Cook
And under Chevron, when the court looked at this sort of potential conflict, it first asked, does the statute specifically speak to this issue? And if it does, it's going to apply the statute. But if it doesn’t, or if it’s a little unclear, it's going to defer to the regulators interpretation. As long as that interpretation is. So, as you noted, gave the agencies a lot of deference.
00;04;57;19 - 00;05;30;09
Tanner Cook
Any time there was some silence or some ambiguity, the agencies were able to create their own interpretation that the only real mooring was that it had to be reasonable and then the courts would defer to that. So that was the issue that was teed up for the Supreme Court. And Loper Bright, essentially, should they continue to follow this precedent of deferring to agency interpretations, whatever they're reasonable, and whenever there’s a little bit of a gap in the statute and the Supreme Court said, no, we're reversing that precedent, it's the job of the courts to determine what the law is.
00;05;30;17 - 00;05;45;17
Tanner Cook
It’s not the job of the agencies. Agencies do a lot of important things and they do it very well. But interpreting statutes is not what they're designed to do. It's not what trying to do. And that's really the province of the judiciary. So that at a high level, that's what would lower Brexit.
00;05;46;11 - 00;06;17;05
Jonathan Porter
Thanks standard. That's really helpful background. Yeah. To me, the way that this fisheries rule came about was weird. So in my experience, what lower right was dealing with was different than what most government agencies do. The fact that Congress said, Hey, you're allowed to have an overfishing plan where observers can be on vessels, that's one thing. But what the fisheries service did was to take that to a different level and say, No, no, no, we're actually going to require that our overfishing plan has observers on vessels.
00;06;17;05 - 00;06;39;00
Jonathan Porter
We're going to do vessels pay for it. That’s essentially implementing a tax that Congress did not call for. So in my mind, what the fisheries service was doing was wild. I think it’s something that you don't see government agencies doing very often. And I think there I’ve heard some background about how at some point they had funding for the observers and then Congress took away the funding or something like that.
00;06;39;06 - 00;07;03;22
Jonathan Porter
That sort of explained how the Fisheries Service got to a point where they were essentially imposing a tax that Congress didn't call for. But it’s just really it’s interesting that that’s what led to the end of Chevron is this overfishing plan. So tenor is a big deal before we get into false claims, act ramifications, dare you tell our listeners why this case is such a big deal for companies in highly regulated industries in general?
00;07;03;22 - 00;07;07;01
Jonathan Porter
What's the fact pattern where low for bright to really impact cases.
00;07;07;20 - 00;07;27;08
Tanner Cook
Yeah. Yeah so I think that’s really what's so interesting about over Bright. I wouldn't say there is one particular fact pattern or even a genre of back patterns were over bright as special impacts. Whether the case is the such magnitude and the holding is really so broad, the low rate has the potential to impact just about any case involving federal regulations.
00;07;27;17 - 00;07;40;13
Tanner Cook
That’s what has led me and other attorneys to start examining how Loper Bright could conceivably change the course of the litigation. Because so much of the litigation based on alleged regulatory violations.
00;07;40;13 - 00;08;11;09
Jonathan Porter
That’s exactly right, Tanner. I think any time federal agencies are doing something that is not clearly proscribed by statute, I think what could have a major impact and that's a lot of what the federal government does, is sort of fill in the gaps that Congress has left. A lot of our federal programs are wildly complicated, and sometimes Congress clearly says, look, we want you to fill in the gaps, but sometimes federal, federal agencies, they go off and do their own thing and it's disconnected from the skeleton that Congress created for the agency.
00;08;11;09 - 00;08;37;07
Jonathan Porter
So, yeah, in my mind, you’re exactly right. There’s no particular genre. This is a legal situation that is going to require a lot of scrutiny from lawyers looking back, saying, how did we get to this spot where this agency is doing whatever they're doing? So I think the ramifications could be huge. So now before we get into connecting over bright with FCA materiality, we may want to do a quick refresher of what materiality actually means.
00;08;37;07 - 00;09;01;09
Jonathan Porter
Because me personally, I don’t use materiality. I don't use that word in too many senses with my friends. So listeners may not intuitively know what it is that we're talking about here, as it has been a few months since our colleague Kip Randall joined the podcast to talk about materiality. So Tanner, could you give our listeners a quick recap on what we're talking about when we say that the false claims Act only applies to things that are materially false?
00;09;01;28 - 00;09;23;05
Tanner Cook
That’s a great point. I wouldn't say material is a term of art in the litigation, but it's something very close to that that has certain significant meaning. And I say litigation. So in the SC world, material basically means capable of influencing the Government’'s payment decisions. So in simpler terms, something is material if it matters to the government when it comes time for the government.
00;09;23;09 - 00;09;47;11
Tanner Cook
The Bill, as you noted during your previous episode, not every statutory or regulatory requirement is really material. Some requirements are so important that a violation of them would cause the government if it were aware of the violation, to simply not pay the claim, those would be material. But there are other violations that are significant in other respects, but they're not so significant that the government would actually deny the claim as a result.
00;09;47;11 - 00;09;49;15
Tanner Cook
So those would be immaterial under the SCA.
00;09;49;26 - 00;10;13;09
Jonathan Porter
Thanks to great background. I appreciate that. So yeah, just to talk about materiality just a little bit before you get into materiality, something that drives me so crazy, I think it drives a lot of people, those of us who live in the false claims art world, materiality is just a really frustrating concept. Judges give government employees too much credit if they truly think that they act in a consistent way in response to information.
00;10;13;21 - 00;10;30;03
Jonathan Porter
One example that comes to mind from the end of my tenure at DOJ is this story of a defendant in one of my criminal cases who was cooperating, doing a really great job cooperating. He knew a lot of people who were of interest to the FBI. And so he was working with the FBI on a variety of fronts.
00;10;30;03 - 00;10;58;19
Jonathan Porter
And one day he’s meeting with some people for us. And these people tell my cooperator that they’re running this scheme involving an obscure government program, and they lay out the details of their scheme and how they're making money and how they’re concealing their wrongdoing from the government. All of which my cooperator is recording. So the FBI agent immediately calls me, I dig into this obscure government program and I find a regulation from the agency administering the program that prohibits exactly what these people are doing.
00;10;58;19 - 00;11;20;11
Jonathan Porter
So at this point, I’ve got a heck of a case. I’ve got a recorded conversation that admits to a scheme, admits that they knew what they were doing. Is that legal? I’ve got a government agency victim and a regulation on point. This is a great case, but this is an agency I've never worked with before. There are a bunch of agencies that are accustomed to working with DOJ, but this was not one of them.
00;11;20;12 - 00;11;36;14
Jonathan Porter
So it takes forever for me to get someone on the phone trying to find humans at the agency who can talk with me. The FBI is looking for contacts. It takes forever. We finally get some agency lawyers on the phone. They hear what we've got. They say they'll look into this program that they're administering and it'll get back to us.
00;11;36;14 - 00;12;01;27
Jonathan Porter
So every week we're pushing for an answer. We're getting nothing. Finally, we elevate the issue. Get on a call with some agency leaders who tell us, hey, we don't enforce this regulation that the people are violating. They essentially said, we don't care about this regulation. And I lost my mind. This obscure government program is getting pilfered by people who know that they're doing something illegal and the agency just doesn't care.
00;12;02;04 - 00;12;20;13
Jonathan Porter
So I got a call with some other people or some other agency leaders to discuss this issue some more. But at that point, I had a Brady obligation. If I were going to charge the case where if I was able to get someone else of the agency to care about the regulation, I'd have to tell defense counsel later, defense counsel, that there were others at the agency who didn't care.
00;12;20;21 - 00;12;41;02
Jonathan Porter
And I had an obligation to tell those lawyers and Brady about what we knew, about how some people at the agency used regulation. All that only happens if we charge the case was we did not. I was frustrated with how that played out, but not nearly as much as the cooperators attorney. The cooperator thought he'd uncovered this massive government fraud only for it to slip away.
00;12;41;12 - 00;13;06;09
Jonathan Porter
So I tell this story because it explains how frustrating materiality can be. It is not straightforward the way the courts think it is how people within a government agency respond to things. It varies tremendously from person to person to interim administration to administration. You can't just assume that a regulation on point is dispositive. So as you can see, materiality is a really, really big issue to me.
00;13;06;25 - 00;13;22;05
Jonathan Porter
But with that background in place, let's get to the heart of the issue of this podcast episode. How does Loper Bright Impact FCA Materiality Analysis tell our listeners why Loper Bright changes what courts see as the materiality inquiry in the FCA?
00;13;22;13 - 00;13;45;15
Tanner Cook
Yeah, it's really an open question at the moment, which is what led me to sort of explore this avenue. So when Loper Bright was first decided, as you could expect, FCA litigants on both sides rushed to the courts to explain why Loper Bright changed the calculus in their respective cases, and not just that judges to respond to a requested briefing on this issue from a lot of parties because they recognized its potential significance.
00;13;45;28 - 00;14;08;19
Tanner Cook
But as I was watching all this unfold, I noticed that a lot of the discussion about Loper Bright was fairly cautious and was fairly limited to just a couple of discrete issues under the FCA, namely the FCA science and falsity elements. But at the same time, in other cases, in other areas of law, I was seeing litigants employ Loper Bright and successfully employ it in much more nuanced ways.
00;14;08;19 - 00;14;29;13
Tanner Cook
So in particular, I saw a number of cases that examined love rights impact on the rulemaking process more generally. So as background for our listeners, there are generally two kinds of administrative rules. The first are substantive rules, which are sometimes called legislative rules, and these rules are akin to statutes. Courts treat them as having the force in the effect of law.
00;14;29;21 - 00;14;58;27
Tanner Cook
There's a rigorous process for creating these rules. For example, if an agency wants to promulgate a substantive rule, it typically must adhere to a strict notice and comment regime, which helps sort of place a check on the agency's rulemaking authority. And then on the other end of the spectrum, we have what's called interpretive rules. So these rules, as opposed to substantive rules, do not have the force in effect, but instead, these are simply the agency's own interpretation of the statutes that they are tasked with administering.
00;14;59;10 - 00;15;19;21
Tanner Cook
Sometimes agencies promulgate interpretive rules because they don't think a substantive rule is really necessary, but other times they promulgate interpretive rules because Congress hasn't actually given them the power to make substantive rules. So their only option is to create interpretive rules that limit the powers that Congress has given them. And this is where it gets interesting in the post
00;15;19;21 - 00;15;42;27
Tanner Cook
Loper Bright world, because in Loper Bright, the Supreme Court went out of its way to note that when Congress delegated authority to an agency, the courts should respect that delegation, but they should also make sure that the agencies stay within the bounds of that delegation. Now, in theory, this should already have been the case before. Loper Bright. But the reality is that courts often rely on Chevron as sort of an out.
00;15;42;27 - 00;16;10;18
Tanner Cook
That is, they use that as kind of a way to punt on difficult questions of statutory interpretation and administrative law. The longer break really hit the button on all of that and reminded courts that they have a duty to police the outer bounds of agency delegations. So how does that fit in with the FCA as materiality element? You know, as I mentioned in the wake of Loper Bright, I saw a lot of litigants use the case in a lot of really nuanced, effective ways.
00;16;10;18 - 00;16;32;14
Tanner Cook
And one of those was to challenge a particular regulation or an interpretation of a regulation on the basis that it went beyond the agency's delegation. But it elevated an interpretive rule into a substantive rule, so to speak. And that type of challenge, at least in my view, fits very neatly within the materiality standard. So let me give you a high level example of what I mean by this.
00;16;33;02 - 00;17;03;29
Tanner Cook
So there's an FCA action that's predicated on the violation of an interpret this rule because it's not a substantive legislative rule, does not have the force in effect of law. More than that, under Supreme Court precedent, it imposes no legal duties on private parties whatsoever. But if that's the case, it's difficult to see how a violation of that rule, which again, has no legal force, can truly be material to the government's payment decision such that violations of the rule can be used to threaten FCA defendants with a severe civil penalty.
00;17;04;04 - 00;17;23;01
Tanner Cook
You know, to me that sounds like kind of a roundabout way of giving an interpretive rule substantive status, which is a big no no, an administrative law, especially after a loaf of bread. As I noted in a recent article that I put out on this topic, there's a line of cases from the early 2000 that pretty much reject the exact theory that I'm now advancing.
00;17;23;10 - 00;17;41;22
Tanner Cook
But the world looked very different when those cases were decided. The Supreme Court hadn't yet clarified the materiality standard under the FCA and lowered right obviously enough not been decided. So in this brave new world of administrative law and materiality under the FCA, I think it's fair game to revisit those decisions and ask whether they still remain true to that.
00;17;42;02 - 00;18;03;01
Jonathan Porter
Thanks to. Yeah, I think you're absolutely right. All these things need to be revisited now because the structure is different. I totally agree with you. I think courts did rely on Chevron to avoid hard analysis under non delegation and major questions. Those types of doctrines where we're now, they're got to go back and figure out, all right, what do we actually do with all of this stuff?
00;18;03;09 - 00;18;28;27
Jonathan Porter
I mean, there's a tremendous in my mind, a lot of false claims. Act litigation is premised on something that is not obvious. You've got a lot of cases where it is clear that what is being alleged is a violation that has an actionable predicate for the False Claims Act. But there's a lot of false claims that cases that rely on some obscure clause or some obscure requirement in an end CD or an LCD.
00;18;29;03 - 00;18;51;01
Jonathan Porter
And the question is, is this in CD or LCD so far removed from the statutory grant that it's no longer a valid thing under law for Bryan? And I think, you know, what's interesting is a lot of times these positions are not being advanced by the government. They're being advanced by whistleblowers, by Relator, who are saying, hey, there's this regulation over here and the federal government thinks it's super important.
00;18;51;13 - 00;19;09;19
Jonathan Porter
Well, what do you do with that? I think in the Chevron world, I think it was fair for courts to say, well, it's in the regulation. They promulgated the regulation. I think that's sort of fair to for us to say it's material now. And I don't think that's the right analysis, period. I think you get to go figure out how meaningful the agency thinks those regulations are.
00;19;09;24 - 00;19;29;10
Jonathan Porter
But now under oversight, I think the game is totally changed. I think every sort of agency decision that is a predicate to a false claims act violation, you've got to dig into that stringently to see what exactly the agency is doing, why they're doing it, and are they allowed to do it under whatever congressional statutory grants they've got.
00;19;29;10 - 00;19;45;09
Jonathan Porter
So yeah, I think this is a huge area and I'm glad that you were part of our team figuring out these hard questions because I certainly can't do it so gentle over bright. It's still just a few months old. I'm sure that there hasn't been a lot of things that we're seeing that tells us exactly what the impact will be.
00;19;45;18 - 00;20;02;05
Jonathan Porter
But I'm curious, what are you seeing in terms of how low or bright is being argued in FCA materiality cases and also in what types of cases and what type of FCA cases could you see Loper Bright being a big deal in the future, so Tanner closes out by prognosticating for us.
00;20;02;11 - 00;20;20;19
Tanner Cook
Yeah, happy to do so. And I think this is a question which will have a different answer depending on who you ask. And I think even those people will have different answers if you ask them again in a couple months. So at least as of now, there isn't a body of case law analyzing how low grade affects the FCA at all, much less in the materiality context.
00;20;20;19 - 00;20;37;00
Tanner Cook
It's been interesting. Courts have been, you know, requesting supplemental briefing on this issue, but by and large, they haven't been ruling on it. They note in their decisions that they requested this and they say we're ruling out other grounds and we're not going to address that issue. So I think it's it's still percolating in the court, which makes a lot of sense.
00;20;37;09 - 00;21;04;11
Tanner Cook
But I think it's really only a matter of time before we see this start to develop. And as far as the materiality analysis goes, I think the developments we will see will be similar to what we've seen in other administrative law cases. Those cases, I think, will force parties in the courts to really contend with this issue of whether the government or leaders can treat a given regulation as material without either creating a conflict with the governing statute or impermissibly expanding the agency's powers.
00;21;04;24 - 00;21;25;27
Tanner Cook
And if it's a guess as to how this will develop, I say we'll see this more in the context of challenging the interpretation of a regulation as opposed to challenging the regulation itself. So to use an analogy in contract disputes, a lot of times you'll hear one party say that it's opponents interpretation of a clause can't be accepted because it will render the other clauses superfluous.
00;21;26;00 - 00;21;44;00
Tanner Cook
That's kind of a time honored move in commercial litigation. Or to take another example in statutory interpretation, you'll hear one party say that a particular reading of a statute would lead to absurd results, and it can't be the correct interpretation. I think we're going to see challenges like that when it comes to the interplay between love and pride.
00;21;44;05 - 00;22;01;18
Tanner Cook
And the FCA is materiality, and I think this can take a couple of forms. The first is kind of a more standard overbroad challenge, by which I mean we could see defendants argue that treating a regulation as material would cause the regulation to conflict with the statute. We know that after Loper Bright, the statute always has to control.
00;22;01;18 - 00;22;36;26
Tanner Cook
Another form I could see focuses less on harmonizing the regulation with the statute and more on what I've been talking about here today, which is applying a rule in a way that the agency itself can never apply it by giving it substantive status when the agency has only interpretive rulemaking power. This challenge is a little more complicated. I guess it depends on a host of factors like whether the rule went through notes and comments, whether the agency has only housekeeping authority or but as such, the rulemaking power, there's there's a lot of thorny administrative law issues that need to be worked out there.
00;22;36;26 - 00;23;03;10
Tanner Cook
But despite this, I think there's some potency to this sort of challenge, especially in light of over breadth, renewed focus on the scope of agency authority and agency litigations. I think this could be really a new landscape for saying that law can't be applied in a way that would treat it as material for FCA purposes, because that would be elevated to a level that Congress hasn't allowed for that the agency didn't intend to do or things like that.
00;23;03;10 - 00;23;12;27
Tanner Cook
So that's again, it's I could very well be changing my tune in a couple months depending on what the court starts saying. But at least that's my prognostication as of November 14th.
00;23;13;21 - 00;23;31;05
Jonathan Porter
Thanks to. Yeah, that's really good prognosticating. I'm glad you got to the prognosticate. It is not me because I'm with you. This could change a lot. All of a sudden we could see a case where a court says, look, we think lower right says X, and that changes all of this. So, yeah, you're right. We're we're recording this a little bit before Thanksgiving.
00;23;31;05 - 00;23;49;10
Jonathan Porter
I think we'll drop it the week after Thanksgiving. But you're right, all of this could change very quickly depending on how courts treat this. I think one of the first things you said, Tanner, was there's a lot of uncertainty here in Low for Bright what the impact is going to be. And I think that's absolutely right. And so we're going to continue to follow this here at Blackwell.
00;23;49;10 - 00;24;09;16
Jonathan Porter
Tanner mentioned his article. It's an excellent article. We'll link to that in the show notes if you want to give this topic some more consideration. And we're going to continue to bring you more insights on Loper Bright FCA materiality, everything. Government enforcement, everything, health care litigation, defense procurement, litigation. All of those things over rights can have a major impact.
00;24;09;16 - 00;24;36;21
Jonathan Porter
And so I hope you found this discussion of Chevron differences, demise and its potential for impacting FCA materiality analysis helpful to sort of close this out. Like I said earlier, materiality in the FCA context is of great interest to me. Judges. When you read judicial opinions about materiality, it is presented in this way, that sort of things that agencies all think with one mind and act in a consistent way.
00;24;37;02 - 00;25;02;12
Jonathan Porter
That's just not how it works. I think one of the biggest areas for the future of FCA litigation is discovery and argument in terms of what is material to federal actors. I think this is one of the big things that maybe sets FCA litigation apart from normal, like breach of contract litigation is we're only talking about things that are truly material, things that would have changed his mind.
00;25;02;26 - 00;25;22;14
Jonathan Porter
And that's not just a straightforward concept. I was in a meeting with some DOJ attorneys not too long ago, and we're talking about a materiality issue in the DOJ attorneys as well. I represent the United States. I'll go and tell you that this is material to this federal agency. I said, that's just not the way it works. The DOJ doesn't get to sort of declare what materiality is.
00;25;22;14 - 00;25;38;05
Jonathan Porter
You got to go in and talk with the federal agency. You got to discover what the federal agency would have done. That's critical when you're defending FCA cases is to figure out what the impacted agency would have done. And that's not a straight you don't just write them a letter and say, Hey, tell me what you did this.
00;25;38;16 - 00;25;56;28
Jonathan Porter
You got to get Discovery into it, you got to figure it all out. So we're going to continue to bring you thought leadership on this front, because this is a really important issue. I think we're going to continue to see courts focus on materiality. It is really, really important. So last thing I'll say, however, you're listening to us, we appreciate you.
00;25;56;28 - 00;26;13;15
Jonathan Porter
We're thankful for you listening to us. We're coming up on the end of our first year of this podcast and we're blown away at the response. Thank you for listening to us. As always, you can subscribe. How are you listening to it? Just hit the subscribe button. You can also leave us a review that helps people find us.
00;26;13;23 - 00;26;35;28
Jonathan Porter
This Thanksgiving season, I'm thankful for all the people who have played a role in this podcast. Being successful. What I do is just get on here and talk about stuff. But our guests like Tanner, put in a lot of thought as to how the substance of these go. We've got an amazing team here who puts these podcasts on, edits them to make me sound like I know what I'm talking about.
00;26;35;28 - 00;26;54;22
Jonathan Porter
That takes a lot of work. So me personally, I'm thankful for everyone who's making this podcast successful and just want to express that here in this Thanksgiving season. So thanks for listening. Thanks for your role in making this podcast successful. We appreciate you listening and we'll see you next time.